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(U) Findings

• (U) The CDR program was constitutional under settled Supreme Court precedent.

• (U) NSA’s collection of two hops of CDR data on an ongoing basis was statutorily
authorized.

• (U) The Board found no abuse of the program; nor did it find any instance in which
government officials intentionally sought records that they knew were statutorily
prohibited.

• (U) NSA acquired landline and wireless phone call records under the USA Freedom Act.
The Board found no evidence that NSA received any of the statutorily prohibited
categories of information, such as name, address, financial information, cell-site location
information, or global positioning system information from providers during the
program’s operation.

• (TS//NF) NSA did not use this authority to obtain metadata associated with
, or .

(U) Program Use and Value

(U) Findings

• (U) NSA typically used the CDR program in response to a terrorist attack or a known
terrorist threat. For example, NSA produced intelligence reports that were derived in
whole or in part from the USA Freedom Act CDR program in its analysis of the Pulse
nightclub shooting in 2016 and the Ohio machete attack in 2016.

• (U) USA Freedom Act CDRs were cited in 15 intelligence reports over the program’s
four-year operation.

• (S//NF) Of the 15 reports citing USA Freedom Act CDRs, FBI received unique
information from two of the intelligence reports. Based on one report, FBI vetted an
individual, but, after vetting, determined that no further action was warranted. The
second report provided unique information about a telephone number, previously known
to US authorities, which led to the opening of a foreign intelligence investigation;

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