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VI. (U) Statement of Chairman Adam Klein

(U) When the Board began to review NSA’s collection of call detail records under the
USA Freedom Act, the program was active. By the end of our review, NSA had publicly
announced that it had suspended the program and decommissioned the equipment used to gather
CDRs from the providers.
(U) This project thus differs from the Board’s past reports in an important respect: The
program it describes is no longer operational. Nonetheless, the short life of CDR collection
under the USA Freedom Act offers lessons for crafting and implementing future surveillance
authorities.

(U) I join the Board’s report in full and am grateful to our staff for their hard work in
preparing it. Our work has profited immeasurably from their diligence, expertise, and judgment.

I. (U) Balancing Security and Liberty

(U) As Congress recognized in the law that created our Board, “[t]he choice between
security and liberty is a false choice . . . . Our history has shown us that insecurity threatens
liberty. Yet, if our liberties are curtailed, we lose the values that we are struggling to defend.” 299
The USA Freedom Act, like other post-9/11 legislation, reflects a delicate balancing aimed at
preserving those two indispensable goods.

(U) Counterterrorism programs that entail large-scale collection and retention of sensitive
information about Americans should be initiated and preserved only if the value they provide
outweighs the costs, including risks to privacy and civil liberties, and there is no better way to
obtain the same value. Even where an authority provides great value, policymakers should take
all reasonable steps to mitigate privacy and civil liberties risks. 300

(U) This program did not involve bulk collection, but it took in large numbers of records.
During 2017 and 2018, NSA collected nearly 1 billion call detail records under the USA

299 (U) 42 U.S.C. § 2000ee(b)(3) (quoting National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States, The
9/11 Commission Report, 395 (2004)).
300 (U) See The 9/11 Commission Report at 394–95 (“The burden of proof for retaining a particular governmental
power should be on the executive, to explain (a) that the power actually materially enhances security, and (b) that
there is adequate supervision of the executive’s use of the powers to ensure protection of civil liberties. If the power
is granted, there must be adequate guidelines and oversight to properly confine its use.”).

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