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complexities of using these company-generated business records for intelligence
purposes. 328
(U) The program remains dormant today. Over the three years this program was operational, it
cost over $100 million.
(U) As discussed in detail in the Report, since implementing the revised CDR program,
NSA encountered multiple data integrity and compliance problems. While NSA expended
considerable effort to diagnose and remediate the problems as they arose and mitigate the
likelihood of recurrence, the errors nevertheless recurred. To NSA’s credit, in response to
“technical irregularities in some data received from telecommunications service providers[,]”
NSA ultimately concluded that “it was not feasible to identify and isolate properly produced
data” 329 from improperly produced data so it deleted data collected under the program. 330
(U) There is no indication that the conditions that led to the compliance errors are likely
to change. If the program were reauthorized and restarted, it is hard to see what NSA could do to
avoid further data integrity problems and accesses to data beyond the boundaries envisioned by
the statute.
(U) Further, advancements in communications technology have already reduced the
potential value of the CDR program. Independent experts 331 and academics 332 have argued that
telephony data is of decreased value given the shift to different communications protocols, such
as encrypted messaging. Both NSA 333 and FBI 334 agree that communications patterns and
platforms have changed and that the current environment is unlike what it was years ago. These
communication platforms and technologies will continue to change and develop. And, as
328 (U) Letter from Director of National Intelligence, Dan Coats, to Senators Richard Burr, Lindsey Graham, Mark
Warner, and Dianne Feinstein (Aug. 14, 2019) (expressing support for reauthorization of sunsetting provisions of
the USA FREEDOM Act).
329 (U) NSA Press Release, NSA Reports Data Deletion, PA-010-18 (June 28, 2018).
330 (U) A very small number of records were retained because they were referenced in disseminated reports.
331 (U) See, e.g., Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board, Transcript of Public Forum to Examine the USA
Freedom Act, Telephone Records Program (May 31, 2019) (statement of Mr. Michael Bahar), http://pclob.gov
(“[I]t’s fair to say the terrorists know as much as you can to stay off your phones. Or if you stay on your phone . . .
start transitioning to encrypted communication . . . And if you’ve got everything, you’ve got nothing.”).
332 (U) See, e.g., Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board, Transcript of Public Forum to Examine the USA
Freedom Act, Telephone Records Program (May 31, 2019) (statement of Professor Susan Landau), http://pclob.gov
(“There are a number of changes that have happened since the summer of 2001. Technically and socially in the way
we communicate, in the way terrorists communicate.”).
333 (U) NSA briefing to the Board (May 23, 2019).
334 (U) FBI briefing to the Board (June 19, 2019).
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