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               beyond the end date of an order do not uniquely implicate CDRs or the fact that the USA
               Freedom Act provides a two-hop collection authority.  Based on our review of the facts, the
               Board determined that these incidents were inadvertent, not willful, and that NSA handled each
               case seriously.  Whether purposeful or incidental, such compliance incidents are not trivial.  In
               each instance, the government notified the FISA court and took steps to remediate the issue,
               including by deleting the affected data. 257

                       (TS//SI//NF) Other incidents raise questions that are unique to the contours of the USA
               Freedom Act.  Specifically, the incidents involving                     258
                          259  raise other statutory questions.  In these incidents, NSA systems automatically
               pushed requests to providers that were based on data received by NSA in response to a prior
               request.  These incidents present intricate questions about the application of statutory terms to
               the telephony infrastructure. 260

                       (TS//SI//NF) In the first set of CDR-specific incidents, NSA’s system automatically
               requested a second hop of data based off                      , rather than the ultimate
               recipient of a call. 261   Note, however, that the statute does not actually use the colloquial term
               “hop.”  Rather, the relevant text of the statute permits a FISA court order issued under the Act to
               “provide that the Government may require the prompt production of a second set of call detail
               records using session-identifying information . . . identified by the specific selection term used”
               as the basis for the first request for CDRs. 262   The question is thus whether              is
               the type of information the government can use to “require the prompt production of a second set
               of call detail records”; that is, in statutory terms, whether               constitutes





               257  (U) See Part II(B)(1).
               258  (U) Part II(B)(2)(a).

               259  (U) Part II(B)(2)(b).
               260  (U) Adding an additional layer of complexity, the relevant provision of the statute is addressed not to the agency,
               but to the FISA court, specifying what an order issued under the CDR provision may and must contain.  50 U.S.C.
               § 1861(c)(2)(F) (“An order under this subsection . . . shall authorize the production on a daily basis of call detail
               records . . . [shall] provide that the Government may require the prompt production of a first set of call detail records
               . . . [shall] provide that the Government may require the prompt production of a second set of call detail records
               using session-identifying information . . . identified by the specific selection term use to produce [the first set of] call
               detail records[.]”).  Those statutory terms are then incorporated by the court in the primary orders issued to the
               agency and secondary orders issued to providers.  The Board is not aware of any FISA court opinions that address
               the compliance incidents discussed here and their implications for compliance with the statute or relevant court
               orders.
               261  (U) Re: Preliminary Notice of Compliance Incident Regarding Applications of the Federal Bureau of
               Investigation for Orders Requiring the Production of Call Detail Records, Various Docket Numbers (Nov. 22, 2017).

               262  (U) 50 U.S.C. § 1861(c)(2)(F)(iv).

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